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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I

Nature of the Case
This is a divorce case. Defendant has appealed from a property modification made

I
I
I
I

to Magistrate Judge Gaylen L. Box. Docket 1. Trial took place on October 30, 2012.

I

The Magistrate's Decision was entered December 27, 2012 and the District Court Appeal

I

was decided March 18, 2014.

I
~

I
I
I
I
I

by The Honorable David C. Nye, Sixth District Judge, following the original trial before
Magistrate Judge Gaylen L. Box.

Course of Proceedings Below
This divorce action was filed October 12, 2011 by Jessica Kawamura and assigned

The Trial Proceedings
Following discovery, the trial before Judge Box took place October 30, 2012. Tr.
1. Mrs. Kawamura testified (Tr. 4:19-94:12) followed by the Defendant, his parents and

his grandmother. Tr. 96:7-206:2. Fifteen exhibits were offered and admitted; Plaintiffs
exhibits 1-14 and Defendant's Exhibit A. Originals clipped together with court file.
Stipulations on income, property, medical/daycare costs, and custody/visitation
were read into the record before the taking of testimony. Tr. 3:23, 1:17-3:7, 36:4-11. One
stipulation material to this appeal was that the home on Gwen where the parties were
living in at the time of the divorce was worth $165,000. Tr. 36:7-10.

I

I
I
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Order of Testimony
For convenience in reference the Trial testimony went as follows:

Witness & Examination

Transcript Reference

Jessica Kawamura

Direct/Cross/Redirect/Recross

Tr. 4:19/53:9/91 :23/94:12

Jessica Kawamura

Redirect/Recross

Tr. 91:23/94:12

Eric Kawamura - Direct/Cross

Lunch recess ll:57AM-l:14PM
Eric Kawamura
Tomi Kavvamura

I
I

Tr. 147:23/153:7/157:1
Tr. 158:6/163:22
Tr. 166:22/175:7/184:10

Carol Kawamura

Tr. 189:17/206:2

Direct/Cross

Both parties rest

Tr. 210:19-211:1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I

I
I
I

Direct/Cross

Tr. 147:18

Gary Kawamura - Direct/Cross/Redirect

~

I
I
I
I

Redirect/Recross/Redirect

Tr. 96:7/122:10

Jessica and Eric Kawamura were married August 4, 2001 in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Tr. 5:12; 53:12; Amended Complaint, ,r2; Answer to Amended Complaint ,r2; Tr. 96:22.

Because "Eric did not want his parents to know that we eloped in Vegas" a year later they
went through another ceremony on August 4, 2002 in American Falls, Idaho. Tr. 90:3-5;
97:3-6.

They had two children, a daughter and a son: "A.K."
.

and "I.K."

Tr. 5:13-18; Amended Complaint, ,rs; Answer to Amended Complaint

,rs.
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Both Jessica and Eric worked outside the home during the marriage. Eric was a
warehouse worker for Heinz Foods. Tr. 9:4-6. Jessica initially worked at the Sheep Shop
and Remos Restaurant and later as a CNA at Southeastern Idaho In-Home Health
Services. Tr. 54:1-4, 80:2-18, 81:8-9. In 2007 Jessica completed a Registered Nurse
degree at Idaho State University and was employed at PortneufMedical Center in
Pocatello. Tr. 8:11; 81:5. But even while working towards that Registered Nurse degree
Jessica had "a work-study job" that brought income to the marriage. Tr. 81:8-9.
Hostility to Jessica's Contributions to the Marriage

Eric was extremely hostile to Jessica's contributions to the marriage both as a wife
and mother and wage earner claiming he "pretty much paid all the bills." Tr. 102:25. He
even testified his income was not community income 1 because Jessica "didn't really
work" though that was not the fact. Tr. 129:12-21; Tr. 131:20.
Initially Eric even denied Jessica paid any community bills other than the cell
phone and cable bill. Tr. 118:6-11. Ultimately he had to admit "She just, she always paid
daycare" in addition to all the food for the family and clothing for the two children. Tr.
118:17-19, 122:11-24.

When pressed further he admitted that he didn't know of anything

that her money was used for that went 100% to her and finally volunteered "I was a poor
plant worker"
135:11.

"I didn't, I didn't make that much money." Tr. 103:7-14, 134:3-10,

Joint tax return tax refunds were always deposited directly into Eric's account.

1

Eric calied his father, Gary Kawamura, to testify. Gary, though weil educated, claimed he did
not understand that wages earned during an Idaho marriage were community money. Tr. 180:3-15.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF JESSICA KAWAMURA Kawamura v. Kawamura
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Tr. 153:25-154:3.

Jessica Always Contributed Community Earnings to Their Homes
When Jessica and Eric married in 200 l Eric had a small home at 319 South
Johnson.

I

Jessica contributed community income to the maintenance of that

home and marriage by working "a home health job as a CNA."

Highland Boulevard in Pocatello was purchased for $85,000.

amount of $52,090.37 payable "To the Order of First American Land Title" showing the
funds came from Bob Y. Kawamura, Eric's grandfather.
11, 100:24-101 :8; Exhibit 14.

~

for Defendant.

I
I
I
I
I
I

Tr. 54:11-20, 63:5; Exhibit

A, p. 11 Warranty Deed). That transaction was closed with a cashier's check in the

I
I
I
I

Tr. 54:4.

In February of 2002, that South Johnson home was sold and a new home on 636

I

I
I

Tr. 53:10-25.

Tr. 48:12-49:22, 50:10-13,58:8-

Defendant contended at trial that the money from his grandfather was a gift solely
Tr. 101:14-24.

But there was nothing given to them at the time that

Highland Boulevard home was purchased to suggest that the money was only given to
"one or the other" of the two.

Tr. 50:17-24, 51:12-15.

Nor was there any testimony from

Bob Kawamura nor any documentary evidence from him of any such limited intent.
180:16-181:3.

Tr.

Objections to Defense efforts to have others testify to Bob Kawamura's

"gift" state of mind were sustained by the Court.

Tr. 170:14-171 :3, 193:19-194:8.

Highland Boulevard Home a Joint Marital Selection

That Highland Boulevard home was not previously owned by either Jessica or Eric
-

"We bought it together. We were married."

Tr. 49:10-13.
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of that purchase the deed to that house on Highland Boulevard was from Ian Harvan, an

unmarried person, to Eric Kawamura. Tr. 89:3-7; Exhibit A.
That Highland Boulevard home was paid off during the marriage and the
home equity was used to take out a home equity loan to pay other community bills with a
higher interest rates. Tr. 67:12-22, 92:12-17, 129:8-11.

Home at 1540 Gwen Drive - Warrantv Deed in Both Names
The focus of this appeal is the parties' third home at 1540 Gwen Drive in
Pocatello. At the time of the divorce trial the parties had resided in that home since 2008.
Exhibit 12.

The Warranty Deed furnished "at the time of closing" at First American Title

conveyed that home to" Eric and Jessica Kawamura, Husband and Wife." Exhibit 12; Tr.
42:1, 43:10-25.

2

The loan on the Gwen Drive home was a no-interest loan from Eric's parents, Gary
and Carol Kawamura. Tr. 172:24-25, 179:21-23. The testimony was that the loan was
paid by "automatically" withholding $400 every two weeks from Eric's paycheck at
Heinz

26 payments per year equaling $10,400 per year. Tr. 42:11-16, 69:2-16. The

starting loan balance was $78,750. Tr. 201:14-16.
Carol Kawamura testified that the loan principal balance had been reduced over
the four years of that loan to $43,550 3 as of the time of trial. Tr. 205:14-16. However,
2

Eric's father, Gary Kawamura, was called to testify and he stated he considered the joint
ownership Warranty Deed to be immaterial "because Eric is paying for that home" while Jessica was
paying all the other non-home bills of the family. Tr. 179:18-20.
3

Jessica had been told some time prior to trial that the loan principal balance was $45,575. Tr.

12:11-22.
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that was mathematically at odds with the undisputed testimony from all witnesses that
Eric made 26 payments of $400 every two weeks for all of the four years they had that
home together -

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

$400 paid "26 times a year"

"'I have 26 pay periods in a year." Tr.

42:11-18, 69:2-4, 106:1-11, 179:24-180:2, 201:17-202:3.

Those every-tvw-weeks $400 loan payments totaled $10,600 per year for a total of
$41,600 over the four years they had the Gwen home together. A reduction of $41,600 to
that initial loan balance of $78,750 would only have left a loan balance of $37,150 at the
time of trial.
Course of Proceedings
The Magistrate awarded nothing to Jessica for any community interest from all the
years that community income had fully paid off the Highland Boulevard home and
substantially reduced the mortgage balance of the Gwen Drive home.

Memorandum

Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order (12-27-12).

On appeal by Jessica to the District Court, Judge David C. Nye reversed and
remanded to the magistrate comi as to the home equity and joint ownership issues.
Decision on Appeal (3-18-14).

Defendant then appealed to this Court.
Defendant's Issues on Appeal

l. Defendant states as his first "Issue Preserved on Appeal" that the District Judge

"correctly applied the appropriate standard of review" as to the Magistrate's findings and
that it \Vas proper for the i1agistrate to allow parole evidence to override the clear and
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unambiguous warranty deed that had both parties names on the Gwen Drive home.
Exhibit 12.. Defendant's Appeal Brief, page 2. Defendant probably intended the word

"incorrectly."

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

supported ... by propositions of law or authority" are waived. Eagle Water Company, Inc.

R

v. Roundy Pole Fence Company, 134 Idaho 626, 629-30, 7 P.3d 1103, 1106-1107 (2000).

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

2. Defendant's second issue is whether District Judge Nye "correctly applied Idaho
law" as to the determination of a joint community interest in the equity in the Gwen Drive

home resulting from the pay-down of the underlying mortgage with community property
mcome.

3. Defendant asse1is a third point "(c)" on page 23 of his brief that is not stated in
the Table of Contents. The 9-lines under that point (c) is devoid of argument or citation
to the record and thus cannot be asserted on appeal.
Such is insufficient under established appellate rules. Arguments "not

"A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or
argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking." Young
Electric Sign Co. v. State~ Winde~ 135 Idaho 804, 810, 25
P.3d 117, 123 (2001); Weaver v. Searle Brothers, 131 Idaho

610, 616, 962 P.2d 381, 387 (1998) (Italics in original).

NO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Neither party seeks attorney fees on appeal.
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POINT ONE
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW
IN NOT ALLOWING PAROLE EVIDENCE TO ALTER THE
WARRANTY DEED TO DELETE PLAINTIFF AS A JOINT OWNER
The totality of Defendant's first argument on appeal is one for allowing a "clear
and unambiguous deed"

Exhibit 12

herein

to be altered by parole evidence.

I
I

Defendant's Appeal Brief, p. 13-19.

I

the District Court very concisely and correctly applied Idaho law in a section that was

I
I
~

I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I

That is not the law.

Under the heading "\Varranty Deed and Transmutation of the Gwen Prope1iy"

just a few lines over two pages.

Decision on Appeal, pages 4-6 (3-18-14).

Here is what

he stated:
***
In determining that the Gwen home was Defendant's separate property in spite
of the fact that Appellant's name also appears on the warranty deed, the trial court
stated:
While the name on the deed is some evidence of the nature
of the Gwen property the court finds that the testimony of
the donor as to the nature of the $52,090 transfer of funds to
the defendant [Husband], and the fact that the plaintiffs
[Wife's] name was never on the Highland home is strong
evidence that the Gwen property was purchased with the
defendant's separate money and is his separate prope1iy.
[ Citing Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law & Order, p.3]

* **

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF JESSICA KAWAMURA- Page 10
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Thus, the trial court determined that the appearance of both parties' names on the

I
I
I

Warranty Deed did not signify that the property had been transmuted from separate to

I
I
I
I
I
~

I
I
I
I
I

I
I

I

community property.

However, the trial court misstated and improperly applied the law in determining
the character of property in a divorce proceeding as either community or separate

property. The trial court appears to have relied on language from Barrett v. Barrett where
the Idaho Supreme Court stated that while a trial court "may consider a deed as evidence

in determining intent, it is not the only evidence available to a judge considering the
question oftransmutation."[citing Barrett v. Barrett,
802 (2010).]

149 Idaho 21, 24,232 P.3d 799,

Barrett is distinguishable from the present matter as the holding was

limited to cases of refinancing and did not involve a third party deed, but involved a
quitclaim deed between a wife and her husband. The Supreme Comi made it clear that
Barrett was a narrow and limited exception to the parole evidence rule when it later
stated:
Although unnecessary to the determination of this appeal, we feel it is
important to reiterate the limited scope of our holding in Barrett v.
Barrett, 149 Idaho 21,232 P.3d 799 (2010). In that case we held that
"the language of a deed executed in the course of refinancing does not
conclusively determine the character of property for purposes of a
divorce action." Id. at 24, 232 P.3d at 802. That is a narrow exception to
the general requirement that deeds are to be interpreted by their plain
language. This Court recognized that when a deed is executed at the
behest of a bank during refinancing, it is not necessarily a completely
accurate portrayal of the grantor's intent. Barrett should not be
interpreted as allowing extrinsic evidence in other situations where
the deed is unambiguous. [citing Garrett v. Garrett, 154 Idaho 788,
791 n. 1, 302 P.3d 1061, 1064 n.1 (2013)]
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF JESSICA KAWAMURA- Page 11
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I

Thus, although the Barrett opinion appears to disparage the law as stated in Hall v.

Hall, the law in Hall is still controlling and relevant in this matter. The Court in Hall
stated that: "Where the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous the intention of
the parties must4 be determined from the deed itself, and parol evidence is not
admissible to show intent."

[citing Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 484, 777 13.2d 255, 256

(1989)].

This case involves a question of whether the Gwen home, which was purchased in
part with Defendant's separate property, was transmuted to community property through
operation of the Warranty Deed, which transfers a fee simple interest in the Gwen
property to "Eric Kawamura and Jessica Kawamura, husband and wife."
Exhibit 12; Warranty Deed, pg. 9 of Appellant·s Reply Brief.].

[Citing Trial

When transmutation of

property is being asserted, the party making the assertion must prove the requisite intent
to transmute by clear and convincing evidence.
222, 657 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Ct. App. 1983)].

[Citing Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215,

The Warranty Deed is clear and convincing

evidence. This case does not involve refinancing and the deed is from a third party and
not a bank. The deed is not ambiguous. Therefore, Hall controls in this case and intent
must be determined from the deed itself. The deed conveys the property in fee simple to
both Defendant and Plaintiff. The trial court looked beyond the deed and considered
parole evidence when determining the character of the Gwen property. This was improper
and an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the issue of the character of the Gwen property is
4

All italics and bold herein are added unless stated otherwise.
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remanded for further consideration consistent with the Hall opinion. -

Decision on

Appeal, pages 4-6 (3-18-14)

* * *

Defendant's Appeal brief herein argues "Judge Nye assumes that the Barrett
opinion controls the reasoning behind the Magistrate Court's findings."
Appeal Brief, p. 13. Defendant further states that

Defendant's

"The implication that the Magistrate

Comi did not consider Hall and only relied on Barrett to form his findings is an incorrect
conclusion."

Defendant's Appeal Brief, p. 13.

Those statements have no basis in the record; Judge Box did not cite any court
cases in issuing his Decision.
Law & Order (12-27-12).

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

However, Defendant did cite to Barrett in his brief before the

District Court but incorrectly citing it and failing to pick up the caveat contained in the

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Opinion cited by Judge Nye. This is what Defendant stated at the time:
"Although the trial judge, as the finder of fact, may consider a deed
determining intent, it is not the only evidence available to a judge
considering the question of transmutation. Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 2 I,
232 P.3d 799 (2010).
-

Defendant's District Court brief, p. 13.

In bringing this appeal, Defendant does not address the Garrett decision that was

the specific focus of Judge Nye's decision in correctly pointing out that the holding in
Barrett is to be narrowly applied only to a refinancing case and not "in other situations"
as stated in Garrett v. Garrett, 154 Idaho 788, 791 n. 1, 302 P.3d 1061, 1064 n.1 (2013).
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This Court was firm in Garrett that a clear and unambiguous deed cannot be modified by

parole evidence:
Although unnecessary to the determination of this appeal, we feel it is
important to reiterate the limited scope of our holding in Barrett v. Barrett,
149 Idaho 21, 232 P.3d 799 (2010). In that case we held that "the language
of a deed executed in the course of refinancing does not conclusively
determine the character of property for purposes of a divorce action." Id. at
24, 232 P.3d at 802. That is a narrow exception to the general requirement
that deeds are to be interpreted by their plain language. This Court
recognized that when a deed is executed at the behest of a bank during
refinancing, it is not necessarily a completely accurate portrayal of the
grantor's intent. Barrett should not be interpreted as allowing extrinsic
evidence in other situations where the deed is unambiguous. - Garrett v.
Garrett, 154 Idaho 788, 791 n. 1, 302 P.3d 1061, 1064 n.1 (2013)

The Evolution through /Ioskinson to Barrett

Before Judge Nye the Defendant argued that Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho
448, 80 P.3d 1049 (2003), decided prior to Barrett, supported his argument for the marital

home being solely his property. See,

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I-.
.

Defendant's District Court brief, page 14.

Hoskinson involved a deed given solely to "facilitate the financing" and that the joint
deed was signed among "many other papers" that the "lender presented to him during the
loan closing."

Hoskinson, 139 Idaho at 459, 80 P.3d at 1060.

That element was lacking

in this case.
Joint names did not just "happen" to "appear" on the Warranty Deed. Specifically,
Defendant's District Court appeal brief argued the joint names \Varranty Deed on the
home on 1540 Gwen Drive was "the only time" Jessica's name "happened to appear on
the deed." Defendant's District Court brief, page 16. Similarly, Defendant referenced

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF JESSICA KAWAMURA Kawamura v. Kawamura
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I
I

that joint Warranty Deed at the outset of his District Comi brief by referring to it a "the

I

mere existence of a deed" as if it was only incidental.

I
I

page 6, "Statement of Issues #2.

~

I
I
I
I

I
I

I

That mere-happened argument was then asserted as an

"inadvertent mistake by the closing agent" that "occurred without my direction or
approval":

I
I
I
I
I

Defendant's District Court brief,

"an inadvertent mistake by the closing agent that occurred
without my direction or approval." 5
Defendant's Brief,
page 16

That "mistake" and "played no part" argument was made by Defendant was made
in his District Court brief even though it was undisputed that Defendant was "present at
the closing."

Defendant's District Court brief, page 16.

Jessica's name jointly on the Warranty Deed was neither a mistake nor was it
inadvertent. Nor was it something that occurred "by the closing agent" to which Eric
Kawamura was unaware. His specific notice, knowledge and consent of that joint '"Eric

Ka,vamura and Jessica Kawamura, husband and wife" warranty deed is shown by the
initials of both Eric and Jessica to the left of their names on the Exhibit 12 Warranty
Deed:

5

The paragraph from which this comes is the third paragraph on page 16 of Defendant's District
Court Appeal Brief. It appears to be something that Defendant gave to his legal counsel and was just
inserted in the Defendant's District Court brief verbatim. This contention was not made to Judge Box; it
is nowhere to be found in the trial transcript. Nor do any phrases such as "without my direction" or
"inadvertent mistake" or even words like "inadvertent" appear in the trial transcript.

'

••

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF JESSICA KAWAMURA Kawamura v, Kawamura

Page 15

I
I
I

~ Pioneer

2082673"/

Co.

135 N. Arthur Ave./ Pirtatello, fdnho 83204
(208) 233·9S95

irr:w,L nwmn aiuL'tF/·
E;MHIOCK COUNTY !01\1-IO

P.r.COf::QEj} Af HEJlU):ST_ Q~,
Fff_.;;l__DEPU I Y:;/:J:U.,V

PIGl:iF.[R TITLE

I

zuos uEc

2082b73l

11

P 2, ow

OrdcrNo. 20081674MOLT

WARRANTY DEED
For Value Received
Donnld E. Obert nnd J acquelyn A. Obert, lmsb:lud and wife
herei11after referred to as Gran tor, does hereby grant, bargain, self, ,varrant and convey unto

I

{ ~ Eric l<nwnmura and J essica Ka wa mura, bu sband nod wife
hereinafter referred to as Grantee, whose current address is 1540 Gwen Drive, Pocatello, ID 83204 !he
following described premises, to-wit:

Loi 38, Block 3, HrLLSIDE SUBDIVISION, as the same appears on lhc official plat thereof, filed in the
office of the County Recorder of Bannock County, ldaho.

I
I
I
I
I
I
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POINT TWO

I

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW
AS TO AN INTEREST FROM PAY-DOWN Of THE UNDERLYING
MORTGAGE PRINCIPAL FROM REGULAR COMMUNITY INCOME
PAYMENTS TOWARDS THE MORTGAGE

I

Defendant's second point argues that any community money paid to reduce the

I
I
I
I
I
M
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I

home loan balance did not enhance the value of the Gwen property but nowhere
addresses any error of Judge Nye.

Defendant's District Court brief, pages 19-23.

Indeed, the words "District Court" nor "Judge Nye" nor any citation to Judge Nye's
March 18, 2014 appear anywhere in those four pages. Curiously, there are three citations
to "Reply Brief of Jessica Kawamura" pages 2 and 10 as if Defendant were before the
Judge Nye at the district court.

Defendant's District Court brief, pages 19-20.

Thus, absent any error of Judge Nye being specified, one has to guess what the
argument was intended to be. That is not sufficient under Eagle Water Company, Inc. v.
Roundy Pole Fence Company, 134 Idaho 626, 629-30, 7 P.3d 1103, 1106-1107 (2000);
Young Electric Sign Co. v. State, Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 810, 25 P.3d 117, 123 (2001);
Weaver v. Searle Brothers, 131 Idaho 610,616,962 P.2d 381,387 (1998).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff will address what is guessed to be the intended argument
that pay-down of the underlying mortgage loan with community property wages does not
create community property equity.
Under the heading "Equity in the Gwen Home" the District Court again
concisely and correctiy applied Idaho law in a section that was just under two pages.
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Decision on Appeal, pages 4-6 (3-18-14).

Here is what the District Court stated:
***

U. Equity in the Gwen Home
Appellant also challenges the trial court's determination that the value of the Gwen
home decreased since it was purchased and that there was no community interest in the
Gwen home. The analysis in the trial court decision on this issue is limited to the
following:
Even though payments to his parents for the loan on the Gwen house were
made from the defendant's salary, which was community property, there is
no proof that the payment from the community funds in any way increased
the value of or the equity in the house on Gwen. The Gwen house was
purchased in 2008 for $172,291. Its value today is $165,000. It has
depreciated in value and the community has no interest in the house.
[ Citing Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law &
Order, p.3]

The testimony in the record from Respondent is that he paid $400 every two weeks
or 26 total payments per year towards a loan from his parents and that he was continuing
to make those payments as of the date of the court trial. The home was purchased in
December 2008. Assuming payments on the loan began in January 2009 and continued to
the date of trial in October 2012, there would have been approximately 95 payments (78
payments for the first 3 years and roughly 17 payments in 8 months of 2012) of $400 for a
total of $38,000 dollars in reimbursement on the no-interest loan from his parents. This
would indicate that $38,000 worth of equity had been established in the Gwen home. The

pay1nents were made with income that was community property. Even assuming that the
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF JESSICA KAWAMURA Kawamura v. Kawamura
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bulk of the Gwen home was purchased with separate funds or that the home itself is

separate property, the cornmunity would still have an interest in the equity accruedfi·om
the pay down of the loan because "when community funds are used to enhance the value

of one spouse's separate property, such enhancement is community property for which the
community is entitled to reimbursement."

[Citing Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172, 898

P.2d 1081, 1083 (1995)]

The market value of the home may have decreased by over $7,000, but that would
leave approximately $31,000 in equity in the home that should be divided between
pmiies. The trial court's conclusion that community funds in no way increased the equity
in the home is clearly erroneous and not supported by the record. This issue must be

remanded for further consideration given the determination in part one of this decision
and the clear error now explained. Specific findings regarding the amount of equity in the
home should be stated with clarity on remand and any division of the equity should be in
accordance with established law. -

Decision

on

Appeal, pages 4-6 (3-18-14)

***
In deciding that the pay-down of a mortgage loan with community funds created
community property equity, Judge Nye correctly applied the law and properly cited to
Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172, 898 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1995).

Defendant argues that it "is false" that Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 80
P.3d 1049 (2003) requires that Jessica be reimbursed for one half of all community wages
"that went to reduce the home loan."

Defendant's District Court brief, p. 20.
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also argues that "in its complete and accurate form the general rule with regard to
reimbursement for enhancements" is as stated in Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172-73,
898 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1995) followed by this quote:
It is very well established when community funds are used to
enhance the value of one spouse's separate property, such
enhancement is community property for which the community
is entitled to reimbursement, unless such funds used for
enhancements are intended as a gift
Defendant's District Court brief, p. 20 (Bold not in brief).

No evidence community wages were "gifts"
In citing to that "complete and accurate rule" Defendant defeats himselt; he does
not bring himself within the rule. Stated otherwise, there is no evidence that Jessica ever
intended that her interest in community property wages were "intended as a gift" to

Defendant. And Defendant cites to no such evidence in the trial record or in the appeal
record before Judge Nye.

The amount of enhancement was proven
Further, in the following quote on page 21 of Defendant's brief the last line is
exactly what Judge Nye did:

[I]n situations where a spouse's equity in property has been
increased through the application of community funds to the
payment of debt on the property, the measure of
reimbursement to the community should be the amount by
which such equity is enhanced."
The full quote would read this way:
It is well established that when community funds are used to enhance the
value of one spouse's separate property, such enhancement is community
property for which the community is entitled to reimbursement, unless such
funds used for enhancement are intended as a gift. E.g., Suchan v. Suchan,
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF JESSICA KAWAMURA Kawamura v. Kawamura
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106 Idaho 654, 661, 682 P.2d 607, 614 (1984); Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461,
465, 546 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1976); Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 Idaho 44, 53, 277
P.2d 278,283 (1954). In Gapsch, this Court held that community funds
spent to reduce the principal of a mortgaged indebtedness on one spouse's
separate property retain their character as community property and can
be reimbursed. As the Court explained, in situations where a spouse's
equity in property has been increased through the application of community
funds to the payment of debt on the property, the measure of
reimbursement to the community should be the amount by which such
equity is enhanced. Id. - Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448,460,
80 P.3d 1049, 1061 (2003)

The holding and rule restated in Hoskinson originated with Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76
Idaho 44, 277 P.2d 278 (1954) and specifically and clearly reads:
As a general rule where the separate property of the husband is improved or
his equity therein enhanced by community funds the community is entitled
to be reimbursed from such separate estate unless such funds used for
improvement or enhancement are intended as a gift. The claim for
reilnbursernent has been held to be in the nature of a charge or an equitable
lien against such separate property so improved or the equity of the husband
therein enlarged. It would appear that the measure of the compensation
generally is the increased value of the property due to the improvements; in
instances where his equity therein has been increased through the
application of community funds to the payment of the debt thereon the
measure should be the amount by which such equity is enhanced.* **We
hold that the court correctly found and ruled that community ftmds in the
sum of$2,514.78 expended to reduce the principal of the mortgage
indebtedness on the separate property of the husband are and remain
community property of the parties mul in the nature of a charge or £111
equitable lien against the separate property of the husband.
-

Gapsch, 277 P.2d at 283

It was not disputed that the pay-down of the mortgage came from "automatic"
withholding of $400 every two weeks from Defendant's paycheck at Heinz Foods; 26
payments per year. Tr. 42:11-16, 69:2-16. And $400 every two weeks for all of the four
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years they had that Gwen Drive home together

$400 paid "26 times a year"

"I have

26 pay periods in a year." Tr. 42:11-18, 69:2-4, 106:1-11, 179:24-180:2, 201:17-202:3.
Judge Nye stated:

The testimony in the record from Respondent is that he paid
$400 every two weeks or 26 total payments per year towards a
loan from his parents and that he was continuing to make
those payments as of the date of the court trial. The home was
purchased in December 2008. Assuming payments on the loan
began in January 2009 and continued to the date of trial in
October 2012, there would have been approximately 95
payments (78 payments for the first 3 years and roughly 17
payments in 8 months of2012) of $400 for a total of $38,000
dollars in reimbursement on the no-interest loan from his
parents. This would indicate that $38,000 worth of equity had
been established in the Gwen home. The payments were nwde
with income that was community property. Even assuming
that the bulk of the Gwen home was purchased with separate
funds or that the home itself is separate property, the
c01nmunity would still have an interest in the equity accrued
from, the pay down of the loan because "when community
funds are used to enhance the value of one spouse's separate
property, such enhancement is community property for which
the community is entitled to reimbursement." [Citing Bliss v.
Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172, 898 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1995)]
-

Decision on Appeal, page 6-7 (3-18-14)

Judge Nye correctly applied the law and the undisputed facts.

CONCLUSION
It was error for the Ivfagistrate court to award nothing to Jessica for her 11 + years
of community wages that paid off the second Highland Boulevard home and reduced the
mortgage on the third home on Gwen Drive that was jointly titled to both of them and in
which they were residing at the time of divorce.
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District Judge Nye corrected that error. And he did so in full-square compliance
with established law and undisputed facts. The Decision on Appeal of March 18, 2014
should be affirmed.
DATED this 30 th day of September, 2013
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED

~-

(

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on September 30, 2014 I mailed a copy of the foregoing by first class
mail, postage prepaid to Shawn Anderson, P.O. Box 95, Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0095,
Counsel for Defendant.
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